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STATE POWER TO REGULATE LABOR RELATIONS-
MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE
SUPREME COURT'S 1957-58 TERM
DONALD H. WOLLETT*
FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION AND STATE POWER
Regulation of Recognitional and Organizational Picketing Injunc-
tions to prevent physical coercion. The Supreme Court's decision last
term in Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc.,1 limited the effect of the court's
decision two years ago in United Automobile Workers v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Bd.' The latter held that the states have jur-
isdiction to prevent violence arising out of a labor dispute even though
it affects interstate commerce and the conduct is proscribed by sec-
tion 8 of the National Labor Relations Act.'
The facts of the Rainfair case were as follows: The company, a
Wisconsin corporation, owned and operated a plant in Arkansas in
which about 107 persons (100 of them women) were employed in the
manufacture of men's slacks, which were shipped in interstate com-
merce. Twenty-nine of the employees went on strike for the purpose
of forcing the company to recognize the union. A picket line was
established in front of the plant. The picketing was accompanied by
conduct causing property damage (e.g., nails and tacks were strewn
over the company's parking lot); harrassment (e.g., the plant manager
was followed home by strikers and pestered by numerous anonymous
telephone calls); sporadic threats of violence, and "an enormous
amount of abusive language hurled by the strikers at the company
employees," often in concert.
The state trial court found that the defendants had resorted to
violence, coercion and intimidation, and other conduct calculated to
cause a breach of the peace, and that they had unlawfully abused the
right to picket peacefully. It not only enjoined them from threaten-
ing, intimidating, or coercing the officers, agents, or employees of the
company and from obstructing the free use of the streets adjacent to
* Professor of Law, New York University.
1355 U.S. 131 (1957).
2 351 U.S. 266 (1956).
3 Section 8 (b) (1) (A), 61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b) (1) (1952),
makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to restrain or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights given to them by Section 7. Section 7, 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 157 (1952), gives employees the right not to engage in union activity and to
select a bargaining representative, if any, of their own choice.
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the employer's place of business and free ingress and egress to and
from the plant, but it also prohibited all picketing or patrolling of the
company's premises by the defendants and all other persons in sym-
pathy or acting in concert with them.
The union challenged only the breadth of the injunction, arguing
that the abusive language was protected from restraint by the first
amendment and that, in any event, the state lacked power to enjoin
the peaceful picketing on federal pre-emption grounds. The company
argued that the record disclosed a pattern of violence so enmeshed
in the picketing that, in order to restore order, it was necessary to
enjoin all concerted conduct.
The Supreme Court rejected the union's argument that the abusive
language could not be enjoined by the state. The opinion by Justice
Burton stated:
[I]f a sufficient number yell any word sufficiently loudly showing
an intent to ridicule, insult or annoy, no matter how innocuous the
dictionary definition of that word, the effect may cease to be persuasion
and become intimidation and incitement to violence.... We think the
evidence supports its [the trial court's] conclusion, affirmed by the
State Supreme Court, that the conduct and massed name-calling by
petitioners were calculated to provoke violence and were likely to do
so unless promptly restrained.
However, the Court was not persuaded by the record that a pattern
of violence was established which would inevitably reappear in the
event picketing was later resumed. Said the Court: "What violence
there was was scattered in time and much of it was unconnected with
the picketing." Since it found that the peaceful aspects of the pick-
eting were within the domain of the National Labor Relations Board,
the Court set aside that part of the injunction which prohibited all
other picketing and patrolling of respondent's premises and, in par-
ticular, which prohibited peaceful picketing.
Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black and Douglas filed a brief
dissenting opinion stating that the entire decree intruded into the
exclusive domain of the NLRB and should have been set aside.
The decision in the Rainfair case leaves open the question of
whether or not a state court may, where the peaceful aspects of pick-
eting are separable from violence and threats of violence, regulate
picketing which it cannot prohibit. The Mississippi Supreme Court
gave an affirmative answer to that question in International Wood-
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workers v. D. L. Fair Lumber Co.' On a set of facts similar to those
in the Rainfair case, it held that the trial judge, while he could not
prohibit all peaceful picketing, could limit the number of pickets to
two at each plant entrance.
Injunctions to prevent economic coercion. Garner v. Teamsters'
and Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,' taken together, establish the
proposition that, where the facts in a state proceeding reasonably
bring the controversy within the sections of the NLRA prohibiting
the conduct or where the conduct, if not so prohibited, may reason-
ably be deemed to come within the protection of the NLRA, the
National Labor Relations Board has exclusive primary jurisdiction.
It has been commonly thought that recognitional picketing by a
minority union is neither protected by section 7 nor prohibited by
section 8 of the NLRA. Accordingly, there has been some ground
for believing that such conduct does not fall within the pre-empted
field. The Board's decision last year in Local 639, Teamsters Union
and Curtis Bros. Inc.' will, if it stands up on review, negate this belief
and bring such union conduct within the ambit of the Garner-Weber
doctrine.
The facts of the Curtis case were as follows: The Board, after
finding that the striking and picketing union was, despite its disclaimer
of such an intention, seeking recognition, directed an election on the
employer's petition. Although the union was defeated by a vote of
twenty-eight to one, it continued to picket. The picket signs stated
that the company employed non-union people, was unfair, and that
the union wanted the company's employees to join them in order to
gain union wages, hours, and working conditions.
On a finding of fact that the purpose of the post-election picketing
was still to win recognition, the Board held that it violated section 8
(b) (1) (A). The picketing, said the Board, "whether the ostensible
technique, or the unspoken but necessary consequence," was "to cut
off the employer's labor supply . . . ; to keep the customers from
buying his products; or to interrupt deliveries of supplies" was
coercive because it was reasonably calculated to cause economic loss
to the business so long as the employer refused to comply and to face
the employees with the choice of either avoiding economic hurt to
their employer and themselves by accepting the union or sharing
4 99 So. 2d 452 (1958).
5 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
"348 U.S. 468 (1955).
7 119 N.L.R.B. No. 33, 41 L.R.R.M. 1025 (1957).
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their employer's loss and rejecting the union. Picketing with such a
purpose, the Board held, violates section 8 (b) (1) (A) because it
coerces employees in the exercise of their freedom, guaranteed by
section 7, to accept or reject a union.
The Board also held that, since such picketing is intended to cause
the employer to commit the unfair labor practice of executing an
exclusive recognition contract with a minority union, it is not the
kind of concerted activity that is protected by section 7 of the Act.
Five days later, in the case of Local 942, Machinists Union and
Alloy Mfg. Co.,' the Board extended the doctrine of the Curtis case
to a minority union's conduct in causing an employer to be placed on
a "we do not patronize" list. It seems to follow from this decision
that "informational" picketing, i.e., picketing intended to inform the
public of the dispute and its nature, as well as "recognitional" picket-
ing, falls within the ambit of section 8 (b) (1) (A) and lies in the
pre-empted field.
Questions remain about "organizational" picketing; i.e., picketing
designed to solicit memberships and to propagandize employees,
"pure" informational or organizational picketing where truck drivers
are systematically informed that no strike or lockout is in progress
and that they should cross the line,' picketing for recognition on a
"members only" basis, localized pamphleteering, and other forms of
activity which cannot be usefully labeled. The Board's approach sug-
gests that if the conduct is not prohibited by section 8, it is protected
by section 7. Either result would place it in the pre-empted field.
More to the point, the question in every doubtful case-and there will
be many-is a federal question, the initial determination of which
Congress has placed, under the decisions in Garner and Weber, in the
specialized hands of the NLRB.1
8 119 N.L.R.B. No. 38, 41 L.R.R.M. 1058 (1957). See also Shepherd Machinery
Co., 119 N.L.R.B. No. 39, 41 L.R.R.M. 1065 (1957) ; Andrew Brown Co., 120 N.L.R.B.
No. 89, 42 L.R.R.M. 1195 (1958); J. C. Penney Co., 120 N.L.R.B. No. 189, 42
L.R.R.M. 1198 (1958).
-" See NLRB v. Local 50, Bakery and Confectionary Workers, 245 F.2d 542 (2d
Cir. 1957).10 See Hyde Park Dairies, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 321 P.2d
564 (Kan. 1958).
In L. P. Cavett Co. v. District Lodge 34, Lodge 804, I.A.M., the Ohio Supreme
Court apparently assumed that a union's conduct in picketing after losing an NLRB
election was neither protected by section 7 nor prohibited by Section 8. Hence it dis-
missed the union's appeal from a permanent injunction. 143 N.E.2d 840 (1947), dis-
missing appeal from 136 N.E2d 276. However, the United States Supreme Court
reversed, per curiam, 355 U.S. 39 (1957), citing the Garner and Weber cases.
See also McCrary v. Aladdin Industries, Inc., 78 Sup.Ct 12 (1957), vacating per
curiam a Tennessee judgment enjoining motor carriers and their employees from refus-
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The question of whether the conduct is protected or prohibited
depends not only upon findings of fact, but it also depends upon a
policy judgment. As the Board stated in the Curtis case in a dictum
dealing with "organizational" picketing:
In words, at least, such conduct falls within the statutory "right to
self-organization" set out in Section 7 of the Act.... At the same time
... picketing, even for organizational purposes, exerts a coercive force
upon the employees who prefer to work. Such a case . . . may well
require a balancing of the right to organize against the right to be
free of restraint in the selection of a bargaining representative. That
situation is not presented in this case and we do not pass upon it, but,
as cases of conflicting rights arise, we shall undertake that "difficult
and delicate responsibility" which is our duty in the administration
of the statute entrusted to us.
If the Curtis doctrine stands up against attack, it is hard to think
of any forms of concerted conduct incidental to a union's campaign
to gain status as the bargaining representative which will, in indus-
tries affecting interstate commerce, be subject to state equitable
restraint, except for violence and breaches of the peace and, perhaps,
picketing by a union with majority support for a thirty-day union
shop in a state which has enacted a right-to-work law.1
Judgments for damages. During its 1956-57 term the Supreme
Court decided the Garmon case'2 and reversed a California decision
which granted an injunction against picketing to force an employer
to enter into a union shop agreement on the ground that it constituted
a federal unfair labor practice. However, the Supreme Court left
open the question of whether the state court had jurisdiction to award
damages to the injured employer.
On remand, the state court held that it had jurisdiction to give
damages to the employer for the injury to his business caused by the
peaceful picketing.' The majority of the California court stood on the
ing to provide service at the plaintiff shipper's struck plant and remanding the case
for consideration in light of Teamsters Union v. Kerrigan, 353 U.S. 968 (1957).
"1 But see Local 429, Int'l Bro. of Electrical Workers v. Farnsworth & Chambers
Co., Inc., 353 U.S. 969 (1957), reversing, per curiam, a judgment of the Tennessee
Supreme Court enjoining picketing to induce an employer to hire union labor in viola-
tion of the state's right-to-work law. Accord, Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, 317 P.2d 349 (Kan. 1957) ; Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Local
379, Electrical Workers, 101 S.E.2d 800 (N.C., 1958).
12 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26 (1957).
18 Garmon v. San Diego Building Trades Council, 320 P.2d 473 (Calif., 1958), cert.
granted, -Sup. Ct- (June 23, 1958). Accord, Seven-Up Bottling Co. v. Grocery
Drivers Union, 320 P.2d 492 (Calif., 1958).
[WIN=
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Laburnum case,'4 the Supreme Court's 1954 decision which held that a
state may award damages to an employer injured by picketing which
violates the NLRA in circumstances where it could not, because of the
Garner doctrine, issue an injunction. The Court's ambiguous opinion
in Laburnum was widely interpreted to mean that a state could grant a
compensatory remedy for harm caused by a federal unfair labor prac-
tice if, but only if, such a remedy could not be obtained from the
NLRB.
However, as the three dissenting state judges pointed out in the
Garmon case, the substantive basis for the award of damages in the
Laburnum case was the violent conduct of the defendant union, which
gave rise to a common law cause of action in tort, whereas the sub-
stantive basis for the award of damages in the Garmon case on remand
was the California Labor Code. More to the point, the right protected
by California by the award of damages in the Garmon case was the
same right the definition and vindication of which Congress entrusted
to the National Labor Relations Board; viz., the right of employees to
select a bargaining representative of their own choice free from re-
straint or coercion. It remains doubtful whether such a damage judg-
ment will be sustained as within the scope of the remand and of state
authority.
Protection of Employment and Employment Opportunities. The
Supreme Court decided two landmark cases involving an action by an
employee to recover damages from a union for interference with his
employment opportunities. It upheld state jurisdiction in each.
The facts of the first case, International Union, U.A.W. v. Russell,"
were as follows: The U.A.W. struck a company in Alabama. The
strike was accompanied by mass picketing which, together with threats
of harm to person and property, prevented Russell and other non-
strikers from entering the plant and reporting for work. The state
court jury also found that work would have been available within the
plant if Russell, and others desiring entry, had not been excluded by
the force, or threats of force, of the strikers.
Russell sued the union for the tort of maliciously and wrongfully
interfering with his employment and asked for compensatory damages
for loss of earnings and mental anguish and for punitive damages. The
Alabama court entered a judgment for $10,000, although Russell had
suffered an out-of-pocket loss of only about $500.
14 Construction Workers v. Laburnum Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
"5 78 Sup. Ct. 932 (1958). For the state court opinion, see 88 So.2d 175 (Ala., 1956).
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The majority of the court, in an opinion by Justice Burton, affirmed.
The court assumed that the union's physical interference with Russell's
access to the plant violated section 8 (b) (1) (A)." Since the NLRB
has refused to indemnify workers for wage losses caused by such inter-
ference,17 the Court might have chosen to affirm the widely accepted
interpretation of its decision in the Laburnum case. However, it pre-
ferred to assume, without deciding, that the Board has authority to
give such relief, and that Russell, unlike the employer-plaintiff in
Laburnum, had a potential, although partial, money remedy under the
NLRA.
Having thus made the Laburnum case inapposite, the Court stood on
the distinction between private and public rights, holding that the
range of remedial power which the Board possesses in order to stop or
prevent unfair labor practices and effectuate the policies of the NLRA
was not intended by Congress to deprive the states of their power to
deal with the "consequences of tortious conduct already committed" by
giving money relief to persons whose common law rights have thereby
been abridged.
Justice Burton supposed that the state would have had power to
direct the union to compensate Russell if the strikers had damaged his
automobile or injured his person. "Such items of recovery are beyond
the scope of present Board remedial orders. Following the reasoning
... in the Laburnum case, we believe that state jurisdiction to award
damages for these items is not pre-empted." And he could see no differ-
ence, "significant for present purposes," between tort damages to re-
cover medical expenses, pain and suffering, and property damages and
tort damages to recover lost wages. The Chief Justice and Justice
Douglas dissented in an opinion written by the former. Justice Black
did not participate.
The second case, International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales,"8
presented the question of whether a state court had jurisdiction over an
action for damages for loss of wages and physical and mental suffering
16 See note 3 supra.
37 See Local 983, Carpenters and Joiners Union, 115 N.L.R.B. 1123, 38 L.R.R.M.
1003 (1956) (Refusing to order back pay for worker for period when he did not report
for work because of union's threats of violence in violation of section 8 (b) (1) (A).
See also Progressive Mine Workers v. NLRB, 187 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1951) (Sus-
taining Board's position that it lacks authority to require unions to indemnify
employees for loss of earnings suffered by reason of interference with their right of
ingress to the plant, although it may order compensation for wage losses suffered by
reason of "severance of or interference with the tenure or terms" of a particular
employment relationship.)
18 78 Sup. Ct. 923 (1958). For the state court opinion, see 148 Cal.App2d 298
P.2d 92 (1956).
[WIN=
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brought by an employee who was expelled from a union for falsely
attacking the character of a brother member and thereafter was unable
to obtain employment. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Frank-
furter, gave an affirmative answer.
His opinion, like that of Justice Burton in the Russell case, laid
emphasis on the nature of the rights which the plaintiff was asserting
aid which the state remedy was intended to vindicate. Gonzales's
action sounded in contract; viz., that his expulsion from the union
violated the provisions of its constitution and bylaws governing the
relations between members and the organization and abridged his
rights of membership, one of which was to be dispatched from the
union hiring hall. Justice Frankfurter pointed out that the proviso to
section 8 (b) (1)"' gave the state court jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action, even though expulsion from a union may, "taken
in connection with other circumstances established in a particular
case," constitute a violation of section 8 (b) (2).20 This being so, the
state's power to grant relief which the NLRB would not grant, e.g.,
reinstatement to the union,21 was unquestioned.
The only issue was whether the state might "fill out" the remedy by
awarding a full measure of damages for harm sustained by reason of
the breach of contract where one item of relief, loss of wages, was
potentially available from the NLRB and the other item of relief,
physical and mental suffering, was not. Citing the Russell case, where
the opinion manifests indifference to the question of whether the plain-
tiff has a potential money remedy under the NLRA and, if he does,
what items of loss it covers,22 the Court sustained the state's power.
The Chief Justice and Justice Douglas dissented, with Justice Black
again not participating.
The Russell and Gonzales cases reject the "wooden logic" of state
10 ". . . [T]his paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to pre-
scribe its own rules with respect to the acquistion or retention of membership there-
in...."
.0 61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b) (2) (1952). Section 8 (b) (2) makes
it an unfair labor practice for a union to cause or attempt to cause an employer to
discriminate against an employee in order to discourage or encourage union member-
ship or adherence to the obligations thereof.
21 The union did not challenge that part of the state decree directing the reinstate-
ment of Gonzales to membership.
22 "We assume, for the purpose of argument, that the Board would have had
authority to award back pay to Russell. Petitioners assert that the possibility of par-
tial relief distinguishes the instant case from Laburnun. It is our view that Congress
has not made such a distinction and that it has not, it either case, deprived a victim of
the kind of conduct here involved of common-law rights of action for all damages
suffered." International Union, U.A.W. v. Russell, 78 Sup. Ct. 932, 937 (1958).
(Emphasis supplied.)
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court decisions which interpreted the Laburnum case as automatically
foreclosing the states from granting items of money relief which might
duplicate the potential federal remedy." State causes of action sound-
ing in tort "are not displaced simply because there may be an argumen-
tative coincidence in the facts adducible in the tort action and a
plausible proceeding before the National Labor Relations Board 2 . 4.." ,
Similarly, "a state remedy for breach of contract.., ought not be dis-
placed by such evidentiary coincidence when the possibility of conflict
with federal policy is... remote."2
The controlling question of state jurisdiction over an action seeking
to vindicate private rights by requiring a defendant to answer in dam-
ages for economic loss caused by its misconduct is: Is "the potential
conflict ... too contingent, too remotely related to the public interest
expressed in the Taft-Hartley Act, to justify depriving state courts of
jurisdiction?" 2 The Court's affirmative answer to this question in the
Russell case was made relatively easy by the fact that the union's con-
duct was clearly unprotected by section 7 because it involved violence,
breaches of the peace, assault, etc.
It does not follow that the Court has thrown the door wide open to
damage actions in state courts, although the opinion of the majority in
Russell distinguishes the cases that have found state jurisdiction pre-
empted, in language that tends to support such a conclusion.
In them we have been concerned lest one forum would enjoin, as
illegal, conduct which the other forum would find legal, or that the
state courts would restrict the exercise of rights guaranteed by the
Federal Acts. In the instant case, there would be no "conflict" even if
one forum awarded back pay and the other did not. There is nothing
inconsistent in holding that an employee may recover lost wages as
damages in a tort action under state law, and also holding that the
2 3 See, for example, Mahoney v. Sailors' Union of the Pacific, 45 Wn.2d 453, 275
P.2d 440 (1954), an action brought by an employee who had been expelled from a
union for calling the officers names and vigorously criticizing their policies and had
thereafter been deprived of employment opportunities. The Washington court held
that it had jurisdiction to direct his reinstatement in the union in order to protect his
property rights in the treasury, but that it lacked jurisdiction to award him compensa-
tory damages measured by lost earnings. The court reasoned that the Laburnum doc-
trine permitted it to grant the former remedy because such relief would not have been
forthcoming from the NLRB, but foreclosed it from granting the latter because
it might duplicate the federal remedy. For a critical comment on the mechanical
reasoning in the Mahoney case, see Wollett, Taft-Hartley and State Power to Regu-
late Labor Relations, 30 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 9-14 (1955). See also Wollett, Addendum:
Taft-Hartley and State Power to Regulate Labor Relations, 31 Wash. L. Rev. 39,
41-46 (1956).2 4 International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 78 Sup. Ct. 923, 925 (1958).
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
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award of such damages is not necessary to effectuate the purposes of
the Federal Act.2
7
However, it hardly seems likely that the court will be indifferent to
the regulatory and restraining effects of state money judgments, par-
ticularly when they include large items for punitive damages.
Whether conduct is prohibited by section 8 or, if not so prohibited,
is protected by section 7 is a federal question for initial determination
by the NLRB. Where a state action for damages raises federal ques-
tions which call for the judgment of the Board, as well as its pre-
sumably expert assessment of the evidence, there is an identifiable
threat to the development of uniform federal labor policy.
It is still very doubtful that a state may give damages for injuries
caused by striking and picketing on the ground that the objective of
the conduct was "unlawful" or on the basis of a judgment as to their
effect on union organization, collective bargaining, or the rights guar-
anteed to employees by section 7. The NLRA sets forth federal
policy on such matters. This is the type of state judgment which is apt
to result in conflict because of the possibility that the NLRB would, if
it had an opportunity to pass on such questions, reach a different
result. Thus, the soundness of the California decision, on remand, of
Garmnon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, supra, to award the em-
ployer damages remains unsettled.'
This analysis perhaps explains the Court's denial of certiorari in
Swope v. Emerson Electric Mfg. Co.2" to review a decision of the
Missouri Supreme Court reversing, on pre-emption grounds, a money
judgment in favor of employees who were discharged for participating
in a "wildcat" strike and who sued the employer and the union for
damages for a conspiracy to discharge them for their union activity.
The question of whether the employer's conduct constituted discrimina-
tion against the plaintiffs on account of union activities-the "very gist
of plaintiffs' allegations"-clearly called for an appraisal by the NLRB.
There are similar uncertainties about the implications of the decision
in the Gonzales case. The result in that case was supported by the
proviso to section 8 (b) (1), and the question was simplified by the
2
7 International Union, U.A.W. v. Russell, 78 Sup. Ct 932, 938 (1958). (Emphasis
supplied.)
28 Cf. Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 480 (1955), where the Court,
in reversing a state judgment for an injunction on pre-emption grounds, stated that
it is immaterial "just what category of 'public policy' the union's conduct allegedly
violated."
29 303 S.W.2d 35, cert. den., 78 Sup.Ct 268 (1957).
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fact that the action did not require a state court judgment on any
policy issue of significance to the NLRB.
It is difficult to identify a serious threat to the development of uni-
form federal labor policy from a state court decision that a union must
indemnify a member it has punished for impugning the character of a
fellow member. Such a state decree does not seem to have very much
to do with the freedom of employees to select a bargaining repersenta-
tive of their own choice, or the strength of union organization against
hostile employers, or any other policy the implementation of which
Congress entrusted to the NLRB. It is largely a fortuitous circum-
stance that the plaintiff might, where his punishment included depriva-
tion of employment opportunities, be able to get some kind of monetary
remedy from the Board.
The state judgment in the Gonzales case protected the plaintiff's
employment opportunities only as necessary to provide an adequate
remedy for deprivation of his rights as a union member. Proceedings
under section 8 (b) (2), on the other hand, look primarily to the
"nexus between union action and employer discrimination""0 which
interferes with the employee's exercise of the rights of section 7, and
only incidentally regulate union misconduct vis-a-vis individual mem-
bers. Thus, Gonzales presumably would have had a state cause of
action even though the union had not interfered with his employment
opportunities, the only difference being in the amount of damages. He
would also have had a basis for an unfair labor practice charge even
though his expulsion had been proper under state law.
Moreover, the possibility that the NLRB, if it had had an oppor-
tunity to pass on the questions raised in the Gonzales case, might have
reached a different result does not seem to "present potentialities of
conflicts in kind or degree which require a hands-off directive to the
states."'" A Board holding that the union's punishment of Gonzales by
withholding job opportunities did not violate section 8 (b) (2) would
not bring its conduct within the protection of section 7; and it is fanci-
ful to suppose that the proviso to section 8 (b) (1) manifests a con-
gressional intention that union expulsion practices that do not violate
federal law are free from state regulation.
However, a state court judgment which rests on a determination that
a union's refusal to dispatch a member from its hiring hall violated
30 Isaacson, Labor Relations Law: Federal Versus State Jurisdiction, 42 A.B.A.J.
415, 483, quoted by Justice Frankfurter in his opinion in the Gonzales case, at 926.
31 Ibid.
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state law because it abridged federal rights falls in a different category.
The decision in Gonzales does not control such a case.
An illustration of the point is afforded by Selles v. Local 174, Team-
sters Union.32 This case involved an action brought by an employee
who had not been expelled from the union but had been discriminated
against in job dispatching because he had participated in a meeting
protesting the method of electing union officers. The Washington
court awarded damages, including lost wages, as a remedy for the
common law tort of interference with an advantageous economic rela-
tionship.
The critical question was whether the defendant union was justified
in inflicting harm on the plaintiff by refusing to dispatch him to jobs.
The Washington court held that it was not. However, the court did
not stand on the ground that the union was improperly abridging the
plaintiff's rights of membership or that a union may not so punish a
member for criticizing union accounting practices or asking for a look
at its books. Instead it found the union liable because it had thereby
interfered with the exercise of the plaintiff's rights under section 7 of
the NLRA to engage in concerted activity for mutual aid or protection
and had caused him to suffer "discrimination in regard to hire." Thus,
the Washington judgment for damages in Selles, unlike the California
decree in Gonzales, rested on the determination of an issue which is of
concern to the NLRB in cases arising under section 8 (b) (2).
It follows that the state decision in Selles on the pre-emption point
is analytically in the same category as the California decision on re-
mand of the Garmon case, supra, and that its validity is, accordingly,
subject to the same doubt.
Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Agreements. The Supreme
Court's decision during the 1956-57 Term in the Lincoln Mills case"'
stated that Section 301 of Taft-Hartley, 4 which opens the doors of the
federal district courts to breach of contract actions between employers
and unions in industries affecting interstate commerce, also creates a
federal cause of action to which federal substantive law is applicable.
The court held that Congress intended, by enacting section 301, to
make arbitration agreements specifically enforceable as a matter of
32 50 Wn.2d 660, 314 P.2d 456 (1957), cert. den., 78 Sup. Ct. 1134 (1958).
z3 Textile Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). For a critical analysis of
this decision, see Bickel and Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process:
The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1957). Cf. Wollett and Wellington,
Federalism and Breach of the Labor Agreement, 7 Stan. L. Rev. 445 (1955).
3"61 STAT. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1952).
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federal law. The rationale of the opinion of the Court, per Justice
Douglas, was that, since Congress meant for collective bargaining
agreements, including "no-strike" provisions, to be equally binding and
enforceable on both parties, it must have intended that the arbitration
agreement, which is the quid pro quo for the "no-strike" provision,
should also become enforceable by means of effective remedies.
The decision left open three major questions: (1) Does the federal
substantive law pre-empt the field? (2) Do the state courts have con-
current jurisdiction to enforce the federal cause of action? and (3) Do
the state courts, assuming that they have jurisdiction to enforce the
federal cause of action, have the power to grant remedies which are not
available in the federal courts? 5
The California Supreme Court in McCarroll v. Los Angeles County
District Council of Carpenters,36 an action brought for injunctive
relief against a work stoppage in violation of a no-strike provision, as
well as damages, gave an affirmative answer to all three questions. The
California court had its greatest difficulty with the argument that,
since federal courts in actions brought under section 301 cannot enjoin
a strike in breach of a collective bargaining agreement because of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, state courts enforcing rights created by section
301 likewise cannot issue an injunction. Assuming that the Norris-
LaGuardia Act has such an effect on federal courts, the court concluded
that, since the Act was passed by Congress pursuant to its power under
article III of the Constitution to regulate the jurisdiction of the federal
courts, it does not limit the remedial power of state courts and, indeed,
that it could not constitutionally do so, since its prohibitions are not
restricted to injunctions in labor disputes affecting interstate commerce.
Furthermore, said the court, section 301 does not embody any policy
that requires a state court enforcing the rights it generates to withhold
injunctive relief. Its principal purpose is to facilitate the enforcement
of labor agreements by making unions suable as entities in the federal
courts, and it would give an ironic twist to this objective to hold that
section 301 abolished in state courts equitable remedies that had been
available, thereby leaving employers in a worse position than they
were in before.
The McCarroll case takes on particular significance because of the
decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Bull Steam-
35 The impact of the Lincoln Mills case on the power of the states to enforce arbi-
tration agreements and awards is a vast subject unto itself and is not dealt with in this
article.36315 P.2d 322 (1957), cert. den., 78 Sup.Ct. 413 (1958).
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ship Co. v. Seafarers Int'l Union,3 7 holding that section 4 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act deprives the federal district courts of jurisdiction to
enjoin strikes in breach of no-strike clauses.
That case involved a strike ensuing from an impasse between the
employer and the union in the renegotiation of wages during the life of
the agreement. The court said that such a controversy constitutes a
labor dispute within the meaning of section 13, even though the strike
is a breach of the contract and even though the issue in dispute is
arbitrable under the agreement, and held that section 301 did not
implicitly modify these provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
The court distinguished the holding in Lincoln Mills that the Norris-
LaGuardia Act does not prohibit a federal court from issuing an order
directing specific enforcement of an arbitration agreement. A refusal
to arbitrate, said the court, unlike a concerted refusal to work, is not
conduct protected by section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
The decision in Bull Steamship, while supported by earlier cases,"8
seriously cuts into the rationale of the Lincoln Mills decision that an
agreement to arbitrate is the quid pro quo for an agreement not to
strike and therefore should be enforceable by effective remedies.
Assuming that the decisions in McCarroll and Bull Steamship are
sound, employers seeking to enforce no-strike provisions are hence-
forth apt to look to state courts for relief while their adversaries re-
examine the precedents on removability.
STATE POWER TO REGULATE PEACEFUL PICIKTING UNDER THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
During its 1956-57 Term, the Supreme Court decided the case of
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Vogt." The Court sus-
tained, against a union attack based on the ground that picketing is a
species of free speech, the power of Wisconsin to enjoin peaceful
"organizational" picketing on a state finding of fact that its purpose
was to force the employer to coerce his employees into joining the
picketing union. Superficially, the Vogt case appears to be only a re-
affirmation of the doctrine of the Gazzam case," wherein the Court
held that a state may enjoin peaceful picketing the purpose of which is
37250 F.2d 326 (2d Cir., 1957), cert. den., 78 Sup. Ct. 411 (1958). See also Bull
Steamship Co. v. National Marine Engineers Beneficial Ass'n, 250 F.2d 332 (2d. Cir.
1957).38Alcoa S.S. Co. v. McMahon, 173 F.2d 567 (2d. Cir.), cert. den., 338 U.S. 821
(1949).
39 354 U.S. 284 (1957).4O Building Serv. Employees v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950).
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to force an employer to recognize as the bargaining representative of
his employees, and to make membership therein a condition of employ-
ment, a union which lacks majority support among those employees.
It is plain, however, that the decision has a much more far-reaching
effect. The Supreme Court stated, in an opinion by Justice Frank-
furter: "The Stacey case is this case." He was referring to Pappas v.
Stacey."
In the Stacey case a minority of the employees struck, and the union
established a picket line. The Maine Supreme Court found that the
objective of the picketing was to organize the non-union employees,
and it said that picketing with such a purpose exerts a steady and
exacting pressure upon an employer to interfere with the free choice of
his employees, that its purpose is to cause economic loss to the business
during non-compliance by the employees with the demands of the
union, and that it is intended to cause the employer to coerce his em-
ployees in order to get rid of the economic pressure. The reasoning
of the Maine court in the Stacey case was remarkably similar to the
reasoning of the NLRB in the Curtis case, supra.
The decision in Vogt seems to make it clear that a state, so far as
the fourteenth amendment is concerned, may enjoin peaceful picketing,
whether it is labeled as "recognitional" or "organizational," so long as
the proofs afford a rational basis for the inference that the purpose of
the picketing is to coerce the employees into joining the union.
The decision comes close to completing the 180-degree swing away
from the doctrine of Thornhill v. Alabama,42 which held that the dis-
semination of facts and opinions relating to a labor dispute is within
the area of constitutionally privileged free speech and that peaceful
picketing, insofar as it is an instrumentality for the dissemination of
such facts and opinions, enjoys similar protection. However, that
doctrine has not lost all of its vitality.
On April 28, 1958, the Supreme Court, citing the Thornhill decision,
reversed, per curiam, Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local Union v.
Newell, 8 a Kansas judgment which enjoined picketing for recognition.
The case involved picketing of a dairy by three persons, one at a time.
The person picketing carried a banner stating that the establishment
was on strike, and he handed out to consumers literature advising them
of the strike for "decent wages and conditions" and the fact that non-
41 116 A.2d 497 (Me., 1955), appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 870 (1955).
42Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
43 78 Sup.Ct. 779 (1958). Compare NLRB v. Local 50, Bakery and Confectionary
Workers, 245 F.2d 542 (2d. Cir. 1957) (Refusing to enforce Board order).
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union drivers were delivering milk, and importuning them to help the
strikers by not purchasing the dairy's products. The pickets also took
pictures of customers entering and leaving the dairy, sometimes with-
out having film in the camera, a practice which provoked many com-
plaints by customers and employees: The picketing was accompanied
by some profanity, and the police were summoned on one occasion
after complaint by a lady who lived near the dairy.
Finding that the picture-taking was intended to intimidate customers
and employees and therefore was not "peaceable," and finding further
that the peaceful picketing was so inextricably entangled with the un-
lawful intimidation that the momentum of fear generated by the latter
contaminated the former, the Kansas court enjoined the defendants
from "picketing plaintiff's place of business."
The decision underlines the limiting aspects of the Vogt case, which
upheld a state restraint grounded upon an objection to the purpose of
the picketing. Thus, the constitutionality of state statutes that pro-
scribe picketing on some other ground, i.e., that the union lacks the
support of a majority of the employees in the picketed establishment"4
or that the pickets were not employed by the picketed business imme-
diately prior to the strike," remains unsettled.
"6 Baldwin and Hotel & Restaurant Employees, etc. v. Arizona Flame Restaurant,
Inc., 313 P2d 759 (Ariz., 1957) (State statute unconstitutional).
45 See Dougherty v. Commonwealth, 100 S.E.2d 754 (Va., 1957) (State statute
constitutional). Cf. Hotel Employees Union, Local 255 v. Sax Enterprises, Inc., 93
So.2d 591 (Fla., 1957), cert. granted, 355 U.S. 902 (1957) (Picketing enjoined on
basis of policy prohibiting union which does not have support of a majority of the
employees from using pickets who are not employees of the picketed business).
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